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logical suggestion on this point seems to be that the courts should
look to the intentions of the parties in an effort to see whether
they regarded the goods as fungible. 7
Although risks are usually governed by the intentions of
the parties at common law, in the absence of an express or clearly
implied agreement to the contrary, the courts will presume that
risks pass at the same time title passes.80 The result is that the
rule res perit domino is usually applicable. Naturally, however,
if the party in possession is at fault, the risk of loss would be on
him.8" However, in many cases, the parties may find it con-
venient for the seller to assume the risk until the buyer has
actually received the goods or in conditional sales until the price
*is paid.2
RUSSELL B. LONG
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A RATIFICATION OF AN
AGENT'S UNAUTHORiZED CONTRACT?
A wide diversity of opinion exists among the various Ameri-
can jurisdictions as to the effect of the ratification of an agent's
unauthorized contract. In order to present the questions in-
volved, the following hypothetical case is presented. On the first
day of the month, A, agent acting on behalf of P, purchased five
hundred bales of cotton from T at seventeen cents a pound. On
the second P discovered that A had made this purchase. On the
fourteenth, the day before delivery was to be made, P wired a
ratification of the purchase to T. During the period between the
original purchase and ratification the price of cotton had risen
to twenty cents a pound. When T received the wire of ratifica-
tion he immediately wired P that since A did not have authority
fungible goods as those "of which any unit is from its nature or mercantile
usage treated as the equivalent of any other unit."
Query: Should the "fungible goods" qualification be implied in sales of
goods by weight, count, or measure at civil law? The point would not be
important in regard to passage of title and risks, since they pass only after
the weighing, counting, or measuring. However, the point could have some
effect as to the necessity of a contradictory weighing, counting, or measur-
ing.
79. Vold, op. cit. supra note 72, at 186-187.
80. Uniform Sales Act, § 22; Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 693-694,
§ 301.
81. Compare Section 22(b) of the Uniform Sales Act with Article 1915 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. The risk of loss will be upon the party in
default.
82. Williston, op. cit. supra note 55, at 694 et seq., §§ 302 et seq.
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he did not consider himself bound and would not make delivery.
Is T liable for breach of contract? The necessary companion to
this question is what would be the effect had there been a falling
instead of a rising market, inducing P on the fourteenth to re-
pudiate rather than ratify. Since the issue rarely arises when
the market has remained constant, the question resolves itself
into the query: Who should be given the advantage of a change
in market price?
An answer to this suppositious case depends upon which of
three rules is applied in regard to the ratification of an agent's
unauthorized contract. The last sentence of Article 1840 of the
Louisiana Civil Code would seem to settle the matter in this jur-
isdiction: "Contracts, however, made. in the name of another,
under void powers, will be valid, if ratified by the principal be-
fore the other contracting party has signified his dissent to the
agreement."' Yet, an examination of the Louisiana jurisprudence
reveals the surprising fact that Article 1840 has never been men-
tioned in approximately the twenty Cases on this subject.2 The
majority rule of the United States Supreme Court is expressed in
Clews v. Jamieso3 where the court held that a ratification by a
principal of an unauthorized contract of his agent is binding on
the third party unless the third party withdraws previous to rati-
fication. Another view followed in a large number of states is
that adopted by the Restatement of Agency: "At the election
of the third person, an affirmance of the transaction with him is
not effective as ratification if it occurs after the situation has so
materially changed that it would be inequitable to subject him to
1. Art. 1840, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Contracts, which could only be made
by persons possessing certain powers, either delegated by contract, given by
virtue of any private or public office, or vested by operation of law, or also
void, where there is error as to character, quality or office under color of
which such contract was made. Contracts entered into under forged or void
powers or assignments, or with persons without authority, assuming to act
as public or private officers, are governed by this rule. Contracts, however,
made in the name of another, under void powers, will be valid, if ratified by
the principal before the other contracting party has signified his dissent to
the agreement."
2. This lack of discussion is probably due to the failure of attorneys to
mention the article in their briefs, for if it were called to the court's atten-
tion some comment on it would have undoubtedly resulted.
3. 182 U.S. 461, 21 S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183 (1901). Plaintiff, on July 16,
authorized his agent to sell 700 shares of stock at $229. Agent instead, with-
out authority, sold at $223. When, at the end of July, the exchange was
balanced defendant was substituted as buyer. On September 9, plaintiff
authorized the act of his agent by letter to the defendant stating that he
would bring an action to enforce the contract. By this time the market had
dropped nearly 100 points. Plaintiff sold stock on the market for $130. Suit
was for the difference between the contract price and the market price when
the stock was sold.
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liability thereon."' Under this view ratification to be effective
must be made within a reasonable time. A third view, followed in
Wisconsin and a few other states and known as the "Wisconsin
rule," was adopted in the case of Dodge v. Hopkins.5 There the
court held that a ratification was not effective unless the third
party assented to it, no matter when the ratification was made.
A study of the Louisiana decisions in point reveals a now
and then approval of all three views. The court, in Grove v. Har-
vey,6 recognized the majority rule that ratification of an agent's
act was retroactive and was equivalent to prior authority. Judge
Simon quoted the Latin maxim Omnis ratihabito retrotrabitur et
mandato priori aequiparatur7 as generally applying, but refused
to follow it since the case at bar came within a well recognized
exception.8 Under this rule ratification at any time before with-
drawal will be effective and will bind the third party. The ratifi-
cation acts retrospectively, and nowhere is this more unhesitat-
ingly expressed than in the Roman law." This ratification may be
made by bringing suit for the purchase price of goods sold by an
agent without authority,0 or an effective tacit ratification may be
inferred from the silence of the principal once he is aware of his
agent's unauthorized act.1 The rule recognized by the Restate-
ment of Agency was taken cognizance of in Cockerham v. Perot12
when the court held that the ratification by the principal would
have to be made unequivocally and within a reasonable time.
4. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency (1933)
§ 89. (Comment C of this section clarifies the meaning of inequitable as used.
"A lapse of time with such a change in the condition that the promise of
the principal is entirely disproportionate in value to that of the third person
may make it inequitable to enforce the transaction against a third person.")
5. 14 Wis. 686 (1860).
6. 12 Rob. 221, 224 (La. 1845).
7. Every ratification relates back and is equivalent to prior authority.
Black, Law Dictionary (1933) 1290.
8. The intervening rights of innocent third parties will prevent an effec-
tive ratification. Williston, Contracts (1936) § 278a.
9. Wharton, Agency, § 76.
10. Zino v. Verdelle, 9 La. 51, 53 (1836). In this case the court said, "He
sues for the price of certain merchandise sold by his agent and thereby
necessarily adopts and ratifies the sale, and it becomes quite immaterial
whether the agent had any authority originally or not."
11. Beaumont Bldg, Material Co. v. Barbe, 13 La. App. 335, 127 So. 484
(1930). See also Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 21 S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183
(1901). "He must disavow the act of his agent within a reasonable time after
the fact has come to his knowledge or he will be deemed to have ratified it."
12. 48 La. Ann. 109, 19 So. 122 (1896). This case can possibly be dis-
tinguished on its facts, as the contract was not made in the plaintiff's name,
and the evidence was in conflict as to whether or not the third party,
defendant, had withdrawn before the ratification. The dicta was emphatic,
however, to the effect that the ratification must be made timely. This cannot
be explained as not being inconsistent with the holdings in Zino v. Verdelle, 9
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Again, in Flower v. Down1" the court pointed out that the prin-
cipal must ratify or reject the act within a reasonable time. Ap-
proval of the "Wisconsin rule" was voiced in Union Garment
Company v. Newburger 4 where the court stated that even after
ratification the third party was not bound and could refuse per-
formance of the contract
Without apparently recognizing any inconsistency, the vari-
ous Louisiana decisions have purported to adopt all three of the
conflicting rules as to ratification of unauthorized contracts. It
will be the purpose of this comment to critically examine and
evaluate the three views and endeavor to ascertain which rule
should be followed as the law of this state.
The majority doctrine of ratification makes the contract
voidable at the option of the principal. The Louisiana Civil Code
provides that the attorney, meaning agent as used in the Code,
cannot go beyond the limits of his procuration; whatever he does
which exceeds his powers is null and void, with regard to the
principal unless ratified by the latter.15 The basis for this rule is
that if the principal elects to ratify, the third party gets exactly
what he bargained for. If the act in question is repudiated by the
principal then the third party's failure to have a contract can be
attributed to nothing more than his failure to ascertain the au-
thority of the agent with whom he dealt. A person dealing with
another in a fiduciary capacity must investigate the latter's pow-
ers, otherwise he acts at his peril. " This is a universally recog-
nized principle. In the hypothetical case stated, P's ratification on
the fourteenth came before T was to make delivery on the fif-
teenth, therefore T got exactly what he bargained for. Had P
repudiated, however, then T could attribute his loss to nothing
except his own negligence in failing to ascertain the authority
of A.
On the other hand, let us consider the companion case where
the market falls, but P has waited until the fourteenth to signify
his repudiation of the unauthorized contract. Would this at-
tempted repudiation have been effective? The tardy attempted
La. 51 (1836) and Grove v. Harvey, 12 Rob. 221 (La. 1845), where the court
said ratification at any time before withdrawal would be effective.
13. 6 La. Ann. 538 (1851).
14. 124 La. 820, 50 So. 740 (1909). The unauthorized act was the purchase
of property at an auction sale. This must be classed as dicta, however, for
the third party was seeking to enforce performance against the principal
rather than objecting to it.
15. Art. 3010, La.-Civil Code of 1870.
16. Hebert v. Langhoff, 185 La. 105, 168 So. 508 (1936).
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repudiation would have had no effect and the contract would
have become binding, because the rule is well settled that ratifi-
cation may be inferred from the silence of the principal if he be
apprised of the act of his agent done beyond or without authority,
and does not within a reasonable time express his dissent to the
act.17 P would have been estopped to deny the authority of A by
his failure to repudiate within a reasonable time and would con-
sequently bear the loss. It is because the Louisiana courts, as
well as those of other jurisdictions, do not consider the interrela-
tion of the "failure to repudiate" rule and the general "ratifica-
tion" principles, that such inconsistency appears in the decisions.
The Restatement and the courts which adhere to its rule
recognize that a ratification may be inferred by a failure to re-
pudiate the unauthorized transaction. 8 Yet when considering
cases involving an express ratification, these courts completely
lose sight of this rule and hold that ratification is precluded by
an unreasonably long period of silence. It appears to this writer
that any delay which would make it inequitable to permit an
express ratification and enforce the contract under the rule of the
Restatement would be the lapse of a reasonable time to repudiate,
which amounts to a tacit ratification. Since a ratification will be
inferred by the lapse of a reasonable time to repudiate, how can
courts recognizing the tacit ratification doctrine consistently hold
an express ratification impossible.19 It seems that the measure of
a reasonable time to ratify or to repudiate should and would be
the same. Obviously this rule would be subject to the same ex-
ceptions prevailing today in states recognizing the majority rule
in that no unauthorized act can be made valid retroactively to the
prejudice of third persons without their consent,20 and in cases
17. Beaumont Bldg. Material Co. v. Barbe, 13 La. App. 335, 127 So. 484
(1930).
18. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency (1933)
§ 94. The Michigan courts which follow the "Wisconsin rule" as to ratification
as well as the Wisconsin courts have taken cognizance of this rule. In Save-
land v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876), the court said, "Where a person assumes
in good faith to act as agent for another in any given transaction, but acts
without authority, whether the relation of principal and agent does or does
not exist between them, the person in whose behalf the act was done, upon
being fully informed thereof, must within a reasonable time disaffirm such
act, at least in cases where his silence would operate to the prejudice of
third parties, or he will be held to have ratified such unauthorized act." In
Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 157 (1886) this was cited with approval.
19. This question pertains naturally to those cases in which a tacit
ratification can be made, and is not directed to cases where the ratification
has to be under seal or in writing.
20. Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 168 Cal.
397, 143 Pac. 723 (1914).
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where the subject matter of the contract is destroyed to the prin-
cipal's knowledge so that there is in essence nothing to ratify.2'1
The "Wisconsin rule" holding that the ratification is not ef-
fective unless the third party assents to the ratification is based
on the fact that the contract lacks mutuality," for one party
should not be in a position where he can compel performance of
the other party if advantageous to him, and at the same time be
at liberty to avoid the contract on his part if disadvantageous- 3
Under this view the contract formed by the agent is completely
null and void, and a subsequent ratification has the practical ef-
fect of an offer made by the principal to the third party. In
favor of this view Professor Edward Manson argues: "To hold
him [the third party] bound with perhaps the market rising,
while the principal is free to ratify or reject, is to place him [the
third party] at an undeserved disadvantage. '24 "
It is submitted that the reason offered to sustain this position
is erroneously based upon a consideration of the English rule
expressed in Bolton Partners v. Lambert," that the ratification is
effective even though the third party withdraws previous to it.
But the right of the principal to ratify after the third party's
withdrawal is not allowed under the majority American rule 2 or
that expressed in the Civil Code of Louisiana.'7 Therefore there
is mutuality as the third party is not bound before ratification
and may withdraw thereby preventing an effective ratification.28
Of course this rule is open to the objection that the third party
usually thinks he has a binding contract, and would gladly ex-
press his dissent to the contract were he aware of the agent's
lack of authority. Still, who is to blame for this lack of knowl-
edge? Certainly this lack can be attributed to nothing other than
the third party's carelessness in not ascertaining the power of
the agent with whom he dealt. Under the majority rule which
allows an effective ratification at any time before withdrawal, the
third party gets exactly what he bargained for. In the hypothet-
ical case given, T desired a contract with P for five hundred
21. Kline Bros. and Co. v. Royal Insurance Co., 19 N.Y. 401, 192 Fed.
378 (1911).
22. Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686 (1860).
23. Athe v. Bartholemew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N.W. 110, 5 Am. St. Rep. 103
(1887).
24. Note (1889) 5 L.Q. Rev. 441.
25. Bolton Partners v. Lamber, 41 Ch. Div. 295 (1888).
26. Meechem, Agency (2 ed. 1914) § 522.
27. Art. 1840, La. Civil Code of 1870.
28. Baldwin v. Schiappacasse, 109 Mich. 170 (1896).
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bales of cotton at seventeen cents a pound. This is exactly what
he got. Now that the price of cotton has risen he desires to get
out of a contract where he would get everything which he bar-
gained for. The basis of the Wisconsin decisions refusing to allow
a ratification is not so much that T is injured but that P gets a
windfall, in that he can watch the market before ratification or
repudiation. But as long as T gets what he bargained for and is
not injured, why not allow P this advantage? It seems better
that P be given the advantage than that T be allowed to evade a
contract where he gets what he bargained for, when he was neg-
ligent in not ascertaining A's authority. One of the two must be
given the advantage of the change in the market price. And in
this light it must be remembered that had there been a falling
instead of a rising market during P's delay, P would have been
forced to bear the loss because of his failure to repudiate within
a reasonable time. Since -P carries the loss if the market falls, it
seems just that he be given the advantage if the market rises.
It should also be noted that with a recognition of the "failure
to repudiate" rule, the main argument advanced against the
majority that the principal can watch the market and ratify or
reject according to his interest, is destroyed, inasmuch as his
failure to repudiate within a reasonable time would be deemed
a ratification by silence. Construing the "failure to repudiate"
doctrine and the majority ratification rule together it appears
that the only option given to the principal is the right to repudi-
ate within a reasonable time. It seems better that he be given this
option than to allow negligent T to get out of a contract where
he would get what he bargained for, when the market turns to
his disadvantage. Construing the two rules together, T will get
exactly what he contracted for, unless P repudiates within a rea-
sonable time. This right to repudiate within a reasonable time
must be granted to P, or an agent without authority would be
given absolute power to bind a principal.
Followers of the Restatement and "Wisconsin" rules may
argue that the above reasoning is unsound because a tacit ratifi-
cation cannot be made against the wishes of the third party. It
will be urged that the "failure to repudiate" doctrine is for the
protection of the third party and is used by the third party who
seeks to hold the principal to the contract, and should not be
used by the principal to claim a binding contract against the
wishes of the third party. After the lapse of a reasonable time to
make an express ratification, the principal should not be allowed
[Vol. V
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to claim that he ratified by his failure to repudiate. To a certain
extent these arguments are logical and bear weight. But is the
"failure to repudiate" doctrine for the sole benefit of the third
party? Is it for the protection of the third party to the extent
that he is allowed to evade a contract where he gets what he
bargained for by not allowing the principal to claim a tacit ratifi-
cation, or is it only for his protection to the extent that he is
enabled to get what he bargained for? It is the contention of this
writer that the "failure to repudiate" doctrine is for the protec-
tion of the third party only to the extent that he gets what he
bargained for and to prevent the principal from watching the
fluctuations of the market for over a reasonable time. Therefore,
after the lapse of a reasonable time to make an express ratifica-
tion the principal also can claim a ratification by silence. In other
words, as soon as there is the lapse of a reasonable time to repu-
diate the contract, it becomes binding on both parties and either
can enforce performance.
In conclusion it is submitted that the rule based upon the
soundest reasoning and subject to the fewest objections is the one
that permits ratification by the principal of his agent's unauthor-
ized contracts at any time before withdrawal by the third party.
Possibly the conflicting Louisiana decisions may provide a flex-
ible rule which will permit equitable decisions in "hard cases."
Since this is a civil law jurisdiction and the common law doctrine
of stare decisis is of lesser significance it is possible for the courts
to continue handing down somewhat inconsistent decisions with-
out being intellectually dishonest. However, the general policy
of the law should be to make for security of commercial trans-
actions. Under the inconsistent rulings of the court in regard to
ratification this is impossible. It is therefore submitted that since
the Code is specific in laying down the rule to govern such con-
tracts, and since this rule seems to yield the most consistent and
equitable results, the courts of this state should follow the ex-
press mandate of the last sentence of Article 1840 of the Civil
Code, and that a ratification by a principal of his agent's unau-
thorized contract, at any time before withdrawal by the third
party, forms a binding contract.
WALLACE A. HUNTER
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